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The  sole  agency agreement is part of current  commercial  usage.  Customarily 
the  firm concerned gives -exclusive selling agreements for its pl'oducts  to  a 
limited number  of  conceGsion-holders,each for  a  different region. 
The  European  Community  does  not  deny  the advantages accruing in some  measure 
to  the  consumer  from  this system.  It enables  the  producer  to have  a  nebwrk of 
preferential selling outlets,comprising specialists in the  promotion,sale and 
maintemi.nce  of its products. 
If these  traders  make  special efforts,in the  form  of  advertising,market  pros-
pecting and  after-sales service, it seems  natural at first sight that  they 
should be  the  main beneficiaries.  This  would  mean  that  they  would  be  protected 
against  the risk that  the  launching of a  product,on vrhich  they had  spent  con-
siderable sums, should accrue  to  the  pl·ofi  t  of a  competitor Kho  1voulrl  be  able 
to  sell. the  same  goods  without  the  cost of  the same  promotion. 
It seems  a  good  plan, too,  esrlecially for highly technic[;.l  goods,  that  the 
stockists should  be in a  position to give  an  effective after sales  servic~,and 
generally c.s.pable  of maintaining the reputation of the  trademark.  'l'his  result 
can be  obtained most  ea;5ily by  restricting the  selling to  a .small  number  of 
middle-men  who  are  technically qualified, and \vill give  consumers  the best quality 
guarantees. 
It is nevertheless  true~ that this system ammmts  to  a  sharing of the market,and 
thus  a  restriction of competition liui  ting the free  choice  of the  consumer.  'l'here 
is the  rink that it may  tempt  the  concession-holder  to  take advantage  of his 
exclusive rights  to  charge  excessive  profit margins.  In this respect,such arr-
angements  may  come  within the  prohibj.tions of cartel and  similar agreements 
contained in the  Community  legisl<:ition. .· 
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This legislation is only aimed at agreements  l-Ihich  have  the  effect of restricting 
competition on  trade between Community  countries.  In the first instance,therefore, 
sole agenCies  which apply only to sales vTithin the territory of a  given nation, 
might  be  considered as  a  class as being outside the  general prohibition. 
A French producer, for example,  is within his rights in setting up a  netvwrk of 
exclusive agents for different regions  on his  ovm  national territory,each being 
assigned his  ovm  city or department area;  and it may  be  a  condition of each of 
these  that it does  not entitle the  concession holder to sell in France  outside 
the area assigned  to  him.  Allowance  has  been made  for  the fact  that both customers 
and  goods  circulate easily over  the national  territory,so that  consumers  have 
a  certain freedom  of choice,and there is a  certain degree  of competition between 
the exclusive selling agents. 
This  does  not  &i:)ply ,hm-Iever,  when  l'l'e  consider the .Common  I1farket  as  a  whole.· In 
this case the  complete  terri  to  rial protection clause, in vlhich  the  concession 
holder is protected against any import  from any of the other Community  countries 
results in cutting off the  channels of  trade  between  one  country and  another; 
and  these channels  must  be left free.  Such a  clause, indeed, results in elimina.  ting 
competition between the  exclusive agents  in the different countries.  It gives 
them  an incentive  to  take  advantage  of their exclusivity by putting up their 
selling prices  to an abusive  extent.  It also results in consumers  being dellrived 
of  their freedom  to get  their supplies  from  another Community  country. 
This  practice is forbidden by the  Community  legislation,  ~<Thich is in its turn 
confirmed by the  regular practice.of the  Commission and  the decisions  of the 
.Court  of Justice. 
Exclusive agencies are,however,  permitted,provided  they do  not  interfere ~tth 
the  possibility of imports  from  other Community  countries.  In these  casestheir 
authorisation is automatic  and  does  not  reCluire  specific approval by  the  Corumj.ssion 
In  conseCluence,  firms  which  have  entered into  exclusive  ~gency agreements  by 
which  their concessionaries  had full territorial protection,  have  had  to modify 
the  terms  of the  agreements. 
Exclusive distribution agreements v1hich  leave  open ·the possibility of parallel 
:imports  within .the  Common  Harket  are subject  to an open general  licence as a 
separate  category  (Regulation 67/67,dated i•iarch  22,1967  published in the  Official 
I 
Journal  of  the  Community  rio.  57, dated Narch  25, 1967). 
* * * * * * * .  ' 
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The  Rome  Treaty leaves with the  ~ommission the power  to  licence individually, 
or by category,  various  types  of agreement  which otherwise  come  within the 
general prohibition contained in Article 85  para 1.  'l'he  licences may  be 
granted if the agreements  concerned result in less obstruction of competition 
than  they bring economic  advantages  to  firms  and  consumers  (Article 85  para)). 
Firms 'I'Thich  are linked by exclusive agency agreem_ents  embodying  the full 
territorial protection clause,may take their chance  by applying for an 
individual licence under Article 85  para 3,if they consider  the  surrounding 
circumstances are such as  to  justify the issue of such a  licence. 
For  example,the  Commission  micht grant a  licence of this type,but subject  to 
a  definite  t:ime  limit, to full territorial exclusivity 'I'Thich  \Wuld  enable  a 
new  producer  to  gain a  foothold in any particular  m~rkets.  The  same  might 
apply for the sale of  products  v1hich  enjoy only a  weak  position in the  market 
for their own  special line. 
* * * * * * * 
Another  type  of exclusive agency agreement  exists  betr~een producers of different 
nationalities who  are in' competition with one  anoth8r and  \vho  exchange  ex-
clusive representation agreements_for one  another's products in one  another's 
national markets. 
The  Community  has  not been willing to  take  a  general  vie\·1  about  agreements  in 
this class  .They often amount  to agreementf:  for sharing the,;Communi ty market, 
restricting competition ·and  limiting the consumer's  choice •.  il.greements  of this 
type must,in any case,  be  notified to  the  Commission. 
On  the  precedents of cases  v1hich  have  come  before  the  Commission,  it appears 
that  the  probability of a  licence being granted for  such agreements  increases 
when it is possible to classify them as specialis.''  tion <-,greements, under  ·.-Ihich 
eqch firm  takes  charge of a  specific range  of  products  v:hich  do  not  compete 
with  those  of  the  other parties  to  the  agreement.  In such cases  the  agreements 
enable  the firms  Hhich  specialise in particular-lines of goods,to increase  the 
volume  of their production and  the quality of  their llroducts  to  the benefit of 
the final  consumer.  They are apt to be  specially valuable in the  case of highly 
technical goods·, and  may  come  \·;i thin the  category of agreements., in 'l'lhich  the 
limitation of competition is offset by  the  accrual  of  economic  advuntages. 
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